The recent COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the interdependency of the world and the need for swift and effective government intervention at key moments. At least 7 million deaths remind us that we are all at risk, no matter where public health threats originate.
Previously, the Ebola outbreak in 2014 revealed a deficit of global coordination in response.
These two tragedies have underscored the need for stronger global governance in the domain of public health on a variety of axes, including stronger international coordination, more equitable distribution of vaccines, transparent reporting, resilient supply chains, and clear, accurate public health messaging.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, new intergovernmental institutions were created to help meet these needs, including the World Health Organization (WHO)’s COVAX, ACT Accelerator, and mRNA Vaccine Technology Transfer Hub; the G20’s Joint Finance-Health Task Force; and the World Bank’s Pandemic Fund. Previously, Ending Pandemics launched in 2018 as a non-profit “to predict, prevent, and detect outbreaks faster in the planetary hotspots for disease emergence.”
In May of 2025, during the 78th assembly of the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization, member states adopted a historic Pandemic Agreement to strengthen global collaboration and ensure stronger, more equitable responses to future pandemics. Key next steps include negotiations on a future Pathogen Access and Benefits Sharing system.
Yet recent moves by President Trump highlight the ongoing precarity of our current system. His withdrawal of the US from the WHO and deep cuts to USAID foreign aid contracts “are setting the stage for disease outbreaks.”
The recent pandemic can also be viewed as a warning of the devastating potential of bioweapons, exacerbated by the arrival of AI (regardless of the true origins of COVID-19), and the inadequacy of our current system to protect us.
Our main existing prevention mechanism, the UN Biological Weapons Convention, aims to prohibit such weapons. In effect since 1975 with the participation of 187 countries, it unfortunately lacks a binding means of verifying compliance and is coming under increasing strain as biotechnology advances. Unfortunately, negotiations toward strengthening it have failed so far, but remain underway.
| Among many, three important references for donors include the NTI biosecurity program to prevent bioweapons, the Open Philanthropy program on Global Health and Wellbeing, and the Ending Pandemics approach on early detection. |